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Abstract. Monitoring of host-based events and network flows are the
two most common techniques for collecting and analyzing cybersecurity
data. However, events and flows are either monitored separately or corre-
lated as alerts in higher aggregated forms. The event-flow correlation on
the monitoring level would match related events and flows together and
enabled observing both data in near real-time. This approach allows sub-
stituting application-level flow information that will not be available due
to encryption, which is being employed in a number of communication
protocols. In this paper, we performed the event-flow correlation of the
DNS protocol. We developed a general model that describes the relation
between events and flows to enable an accurate time-based correlation
where parameter-based correlation is not feasible. Based on the model,
we designed three event-flow correlation methods based on common pa-
rameters and times of occurrence. We evaluated the correlation methods
using a recent and public dataset, both with and without the extended
flow information, to simulate DNS flow encryption. The results of the
method combining parameter-based and time-based matching show that
matching related DNS events to flows is possible and substitutes the data
that might soon be lost in encryption.
Keywords: HIDS · NIDS · Event-flow correlation · DNS · Encrypted
network traffic.
1 Introduction
Monitoring of network flows using a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
is a well-described and widely used technique of data analysis for cybersecurity.
Over time it has evolved to use targeted Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to extend
the flow information with data from the application layer protocols. However,
the recent shift to information privacy moved most of the formerly available
data behind end-to-end encryption. If a network flow is encrypted, the enrich-
ment by DPI is severely hampered, and the output of the monitoring is not as
information-rich as in the past. As a result, NIDS threat detection and secu-
rity analysis of the encrypted network flows requires new approaches to support
cybersecurity operations.
On the other hand, monitoring of host-based data by a Host-based Intrusion
Detection System (HIDS) is another well-known technique to collect and analyze
2 S. Špaček et al.
data in the form of events. The event monitoring provides information about the
events taking place directly on the end-point devices. However, the dependency
on the end-point devices is the drawback of this method. If attackers take control
over the device, they may modify, remove, or otherwise tamper with the events.
The flow monitoring may have its own dedicated infrastructure and is more
robust to tampering attempts.
Using both NIDS and HIDS simultaneously, an occurrence may be observed
from two different vantage points providing different information [3]. We high-
light three main benefits of this approach:
– Providing cybersecurity operators with the correlated data through an ap-
propriate presentation layer will help them quickly identify all data related
to a specific occurrence. That will improve their situational awareness and
thus speed up the cybersecurity incident response process.
– Any tampering with one monitoring source can be detected by correlation
with the other source. Detection of tampering attempts may assist in defense
against stealthy persistent attackers.
– The approach allows enriching encrypted flows with host-based data trans-
parently for tools deployed on higher layers. Thus an existing anomaly de-
tection or analysis infrastructure may be used to process encrypted traffic.
To examine the possibilities of correlating related events and flows, this paper
aims to answer the following research questions. The first question is, how reli-
ably can the related DNS events and flows be matched? The second question is,
what otherwise unavailable monitoring data can the event-flow matching provide
when the DNS flow is encrypted? To answer the first question, we developed a
model that describes the relation between events and flows. Based on this model,
we designed three matching algorithms using common parameters and times of
occurrence. Then we evaluated the algorithms on a recent dataset collected dur-
ing a complex cyberdefense exercise [11]. To answer the second question, we ran
the matching algorithms on a dataset including simulated encrypted DNS flows.
Our results show that while parameter-based event-flow matching performs
very well with DPI-enriched DNS flows, performance with basic DNS flows is
lacking. The time-based matching, although generally less accurate, is not af-
fected by DPI enrichment and thus performs better on basic or encrypted flows.
A matching method combining these two approaches produced the most accurate
results on both encrypted and unencrypted flows. We provide algorithms used
in this research as open-source software to ensure repeatability and verifiability
of our results [15].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the context of this
paper by presenting the related work. Section 3 introduces the flow and event
capture model, that demonstrates the relation between events and flows. Sec-
tion 4 specifies the event-flow matching methods tested in this paper. Section 5
describes the actions performed on the public dataset to preprocess it before
measurements. Section 6 discusses the results of the matching methods when
run on the dataset. Section 7 summarizes lessons learned. Section 8 concludes
the paper with answers to the posed research questions.
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2 Related Work
There are three categories of related work. First, we discuss works that researched
information leakage of the encrypted DNS network traffic, as these methods could
be used to directly access the extended flow features of encrypted DNS flows.
Second, we describe works that already focused on the event-flow correlation
in the past. Finally, we mention the Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems
that combine aggregated alerts from both NIDS and HIDS.
Currently, there are two widely used approaches to encrypting DNS traffic –
the DNS over TLS and the DNS over HTTPS protocols. None of these protocols
allows the DPI enrichment of DNS flows, leaving only the basic flow features
available. Subsequently, the performance of the extended flow-based NIDS is
limited [13]. Possible weaknesses of the DNS encryption to flow analysis and
website fingerprinting were researched in several prior works [7,9]. Their results
show that extended flow feature extraction, e.g., the queried domain name, is
generally possible. However, Bushart et al. mentioned techniques that may make
this approach more difficult or even unfeasible in the future [2]. The main disad-
vantage of this approach is taking the role of an attacker against the monitored
traffic. If host-based monitoring of the DNS resolver is an option, the extended
flow features may be supplemented from server logs. However, a direct link con-
necting a network flow to events that it caused needs to be identified first.
The direct correlation of network and host-based data had been explored in
the past. Dreger et al. provided a framework for enriching network monitoring
with host-based context and noted the advantage of overcoming encryption [4].
More recently, Haas et al. proposed the Zeek-osquery platform for correlating
network flows with the originating processes and users [5]. Henderson et al.
proposed a time-based correlation algorithm and confirmed that this approach is
viable by testing it with real network data [6]. They also discussed the limitations
of the event-flow correlation. However, they investigated the correlation solely
from the malicious event standpoint and did not consider network flow features
aside from its start time, end time, and source. Furthermore, previous works
considered the captured times of all correlated occurrences as synchronized and
accurate, which is usually not the case when correlating data from devices across
the network, as described by Brilingaite et al. [1].
Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDS) comprise of several coop-
erating NIDS and HIDS that collect, share, and aggregate monitoring data for
complex analysis of the state of the network. Taxonomy of the CIDS had been
provided in a survey by Vasilomanolakis et al. [12]. However, the CIDS usually
correlate events of higher, already aggregated forms, e.g. attack signature alerts,
and are closely specialized in a particular area [10, 14]. To our knowledge, no
direct link between a network flow and events that it caused had been proposed
yet.
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3 Event and Flow Capture Model
This section introduces the event and flow capture model that demonstrates the
relation between events and flows captured at different vantage points in the net-
work [3]. Specifically, we define the relations between the times of occurrence of
events and flows to allow designing time-based event-flow matching algorithms.
Such an algorithm could be based on the start of the flow, end of the flow, and
time of occurrence of an event. An event and a flow would be considered related
if the event’s time of occurrence fell into the interval between the flow start and
the flow end. However, the environment where the events and flows are observed
is too complex for this simple method to work.






Fig. 1. The general event and flow capture model demonstrates the differences between
the time of event occurrence and the time when the associated flow was observed; w,
x, y, z are data transfer time intervals of various lengths; r is a time interval needed
by a device to process a request and compose a response.
Time is a critical parameter when examining relations between data collected
from different sources. However, when the data sources are physically separate,
determining the time of occurrence becomes a problem, as time synchronization,
network transfer times, and various delays need to be accounted for [1]. We
have created a model representing the environment where events and flows are
acquired. Furthermore, we have identified several obstacles that stand in the
way of simple event-flow matching. The general event and flow capture model is
depicted in Figure 1.
The model shows a simple network of two devices communicating over a link
consisting of an arbitrary number of hops. Events are generated and monitored
on both the communicating devices, and a flow monitoring probe is installed on
one of the hops. It is apparent from the model that simple time-based matching is
not sufficient, as events and flows are captured at different places and at different
times. The issues arising from this can be demonstrated in the sequence of actions
during the start (Table 1) of the communication.
Table 1 represents the sequence of event and flow capture during communi-
cation start. The communication starts at time t0 and a correspondign event on
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Table 1. Event and flow capture sequence at the start of communication.
Step Time Action Observed Data
1 t0 request sent device 1 event
2 t0 + x in-flow created flow start
3 t0 + x + y request received device 2 event
4 t1 response sent device 2 event
5 t1 + z out-flow created flow start
6 t1 + z + w response received device 1 event
the initiating device (Device 1) is created. However, the flow is captured later,
when it enters the flow vantage point at time t0+x. The event on the responding
device (Device 2) is captured even later, at t0 +x+y. It is evident that the time
of the flow capture does not mark the start of the flow, but the start increased by
an arbitrary network travel time interval. An analogical situation occurs when
a communication is terminated. Consequently, an event may be captured before
the related flow is created and, analogically, after the related flow is terminated.
This issue is mitigated by the use of biflow instead of flow. The biflow consid-
ers flows of both directions as parts of one communication and allows matching
events from the start of the request flow to the end of the response flow.
Guaranteeing time synchronization between all the monitoring devices is an-
other issue. The NTP protocol is still widely used to provide time synchronization
as it can achieve millisecond precision with minimal drift. This precision proved
to be sufficient for matching DNS request flows and events in a dataset encom-
passing circa 200 devices used in this paper. However, in larger environments
and with chattier protocols, even a millisecond precision might not be enough
to establish a relation between corresponding events and flows.
4 Event and Flow Matching Methods
The event and flow capture model shows that simple time-based event-flow
matching does not guarantee good matching accuracy. The event-flow matching
methods introduced in this chapter are optimized to pair the DNS request events
and flows specifically. The general principle of these methods can be applied to
other communication protocols. However, as network communication protocols
are too diverse, it is improbable that a single event-flow matching method will
work for every protocol.
4.1 Parameter-Based Matching Method
Matching based on common parameters present both in the logged event and
in the captured flow is a natural approach to event-flow matching. Both the
DNS request flows and the DNS request events contain four common parame-
ters in total. The parameters are the destination IP address, source IP address,
source port, and queried domain name (qname). This 4-tuple of parameters is
6 S. Špaček et al.
usually sufficient to pair a DNS request event with a related flow. The matching
algorithm is described by Algorithm 1.
The common 4-tuple provides a clear relationship between an event and a
flow, but it does not always identify an event-flow pair uniquely. A DNS client
may reuse a source port in any future request, even in a request for the same
qname as in the past. This results in cross-pairing, where two or more flows
share two or more events that cannot be possibly related when considering their
times of occurrence. The cross-pairing is especially pronounced with DNS servers
queried only for a limited domain pool. The issue is mitigated if a time-window
for pairing is specified, and the events that fall outside of the window are not
paired. In our dataset, a time window of five minutes proved to be sufficient to
suppress most of the cross-pairs.
Algorithm 1: Parameter-Based Matching
for each flow ∈ flows do
for each event ∈ events do
if flow.dst ip = event.server ip & flow.src ip = event.client ip &
flow.src port = event.client port & flow.qname = event.qname then




The main drawback of the parameter-based matching method is its reliance
on a parameter that might not be available. The qname is a part of the extended
flow information, and it needs to be extracted from the DNS packets by DPI
on the flow monitoring probe. If the data cannot be extracted, the qname will
be unavailable. In our dataset, nearly a fifth of the DNS flows was missing the
extended flow information. Any such flows and their related events cannot be
paired by this matching method.
The case of the missing qname is a sample of the issues caused to network
flow monitoring by encrypted communication used on a large scale. If a flow
is encrypted, its packets cannot be examined and parsed by DPI for extended
flow information. The amount of information available in such a network flow
is limited. In these cases, a successful pairing of a flow with its related event(s)
provides information on the purpose of the communication that is no more ac-
cessible by just flow monitoring.
If the qname is missing, the method falls back to pairing based on the three
remaining parameters. However, they are not enough to provide a reliable pairing
(Section 6). A different and more accurate approach is needed, and a suitable
candidate might be refined from this method by extending the use of the time-
window specified earlier to filter out cross-pairings.
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4.2 Time-Based Matching Method
The time-based matching method copes with the missing qname parameter and
consequently hampered matching accuracy by introducing a comparison of times
of capture for both the events and flows. The idea behind it is simple; if the three
remaining common parameters match and the event’s time of occurrence falls
within the time interval defined by the start and the end of the flow, the event
and the flow are considered related. However, such a simple time-based matching
method does not consider the time differences, as demonstrated by the event and
flow capture model, and needs to be modified.
To compensate for the different vantage points, random packet travel times,
and drift in time synchronization between devices, defining a toleration time-
window is necessary. This time window has two components – event earliness
and event lateness. The event earliness is defined as a time value, indicating how
much earlier may an event occur before the start of the request flow to be still
considered related to that flow. Analogically, the event lateness is defined as a
time value, indicating how much later may an event occur after the end of the
request flow to be still considered related. The algorithm of time-based matching
is described by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Time-Based Matching
for each flow ∈ flows do
for each event ∈ events do
if flow.dst ip = event.server ip & flow.src ip = event.client ip &
flow.src port = event.client port &
flow.start− event earliness ≤ event.start &
flow.end + event lateness ≥ event.start then




The exact values of the event earliness and event lateness depend on the
specific features of the network and devices that generate the data to be paired.
They are affected mainly by the packet travel time between the flow vantage
point and the DNS server, the time it takes the DNS server to respond to a
query, and by the difference in local time of the flow vantage point and the DNS
server. The smaller these differences are, the lower may be the event earliness
and event lateness, and the more accurate will be the matching results. With
the increasing time-window, the probability of pairing unrelated events and flows
also increases. As a result, this matching method needs to be balanced between
pairing unrelated events and flows (false positive) or missing a related pair (false
negative).
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4.3 Combined Matching Method
The combined matching method utilizes both the parameter-based and time-
based matching approaches to compensate for their weaknesses. When pairing
flows with valid extended flow information, including the qname, it uses the
parameter-based matching. If it encounters an encrypted flow or a flow with
missing or corrupted extended flow information, it falls back to the time-based
matching. This way, it maintains the highest possible pairing accuracy for flows
with all known parameters while retaining the ability to pair flows with partially
known parameters.
The usability for both encrypted and unencrypted network flows and good
matching accuracy makes this matching method a suitable candidate for real
network traffic. Its performance has been tested, and the results show that it is
indeed the preferred pairing method to match related DNS events and flows.
5 DNS Communication Dataset
The dataset used for evaluation in this paper is the Cyber Czech 2018 dataset [11].
It contains both the network flows and event logs, and all the devices in the
dataset are time-synchronized with millisecond precision. The data in the dataset
was captured during a cybersecurity exercise and generated by the actions of real
users.
The initial dataset contained a total of 94 834 DNS biflows and 153 286
DNS events. This amount of DNS data is not final, however. We filtered out
obvious white-noise data, as would do any current NIDS or HIDS. Most notably,
we filtered out events that were not a DNS request, request events related to
flows that circumvented the monitoring probe, and DNS flows to external DNS
resolvers. In summary, any data where it was certain that it could not possibly
have its either event or flow counterpart in the dataset and thus a correlation
attempt would be futile. The filtering algorithm is described in detail in our
open-source software [15].
Table 2. The DNS Request Datasets Used for Measurements.
Events Extended Biflows Biflows
all-information 65 682 54 819 0
reduced-information 65 682 27 410 27 409
The resulting smaller DNS request dataset, containing events and flows that
can be paired with high probability, is labeled the all-information dataset. To
examine how the event and flow matching methods perform on basic (non-
extended) DNS flows, we created one more dataset. The reduced-information
dataset contains the same events and flows as the all-information dataset. How-
ever, half of the flows have been deprived of the extended flow information and
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reduced only to the basic flow features as if they were encrypted. The final
contents of both datasets are summed up in Table 2.
6 DNS Event-Flow Matching
The performance of the matching methods on both datasets may be inspected
in Tables 3 and 4. The measured metrics are accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-
score. These metrics describe the performance even on a class-imbalanced data
set with a high prevalence of true negatives (non-matches), which will be the
usual input of the matching methods [8]. We provide supplementary materials;
the code and both the filtered datasets used in this research, along with the
necessary documentation to verify our results [15].
The metrics are affected by the properties of the dataset. Specifically, by
the low number of unpaired events and flows, and by short server response
times relatively to longer pauses between separate DNS queries. The achieved
precision, recall, and subsequently F1-score values would be lower if the dataset
filtering had been more lenient. Moreover, the accuracy metrics specifically was
affected by the high number of true negatives in the dataset. The count of true
negatives reached over 3.6 billions, a value several orders of magnitude higher
than the 51 740 true positive pairs.
Due to the strict dataset filtering and therefore little room for error, the
results are often very close. However, with the high volume of processed data,
even a small difference in a metric might mean a much lower number of false
positives or false negatives for the better performing method.
Table 3. Event-Flow Matching Methods’ Results on the All-Information Dataset
Param-Based
Param-Based Time-Based Combined
(no qname) (200 ms) (200 ms)
Acc 1,000000 0,999998 0,999998 1,000000
Pre 1,000000 0,888118 1,000000 1,000000
Rec 1,000000 1,000000 0,999826 1,000000
F1 1,000000 0,940744 0,999913 1,000000
Table 4. Event-Flow Matching Methods’ Results on the Reduced-Information Dataset
Param-Based
Param-Based Time-Based Combined
(no qname) (200 ms) (200 ms)
Acc 0,999992 0,999998 0,999998 0,999999
Pre 1,000000 0,888118 1,000000 1,000000
Rec 0,500000 1,000000 0,999826 0,999903
F1 0,666667 0,940744 0,999913 0,999951
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6.1 Parameter-Based Matching Method
The parameter-based matching method produces the best results when run on
a dataset with valid extended flow information – known destination IP address,
source IP address, source port, and qname. Because it considers all the parame-
ters common to a DNS request event and flow, it can create a list of event-flow
pairs that are related without a doubt. This method had been run on the all-
information dataset, where it identified 51 740 pairs. This list of pairs is used
throughout this paper as a ground truth. The results can be found under the
key Param-Based in Tables 3 and 4.
Out of the 51 740 pairs, only ten pairs were cross-paired. The cross-pairing is
caused by a client reusing a port to query the same server for the same domain
in an interval so short that it cannot be distinguished which event is related
to which flow. The matching was unique for the remaining pairs, so a flow was
paired with only a single event and vice versa. This is caused by DNS requests’
specific format, where one flow usually corresponds with one request for a single
domain.
While the parameter-based matching method achieved the most accurate
results on the all-information dataset, it was unable to create a pair if any of the
parameters had been missing. Consequently, this method was able to create only
50 % of the pairs when run on the reduced-information dataset, producing the
worst results of all tested methods. This drawback makes this method unsuitable
for use in real traffic, where the collected information might be incomplete.
To lower the reliance on the qname, the parameter-based matching method
had been modified to match by the three remaining parameters. Then it had been
run again on both the datasets and the results can be found under the key Param-
Based (no qname) in Tables 3 and 4. The precision is its weak spot, producing
a high number of false positives. This is a serious drawback, as low precision
may clutter the result with false positives so that important information may
get overlooked. On the other hand, it is not influenced by flow encryption.
The parameter-based event-flow matching produces accurate results if com-
plete monitoring information is provided. However, this is rarely the case in
real traffic. When the monitoring provides information incomplete due to an
overload, error, or encryption, the matching results are not satisfactory.
Table 5. The Jitter of Events From Flow Start and Flow End on the All-Information
Dataset
Percentile 1 5 25 50 75 95 99
Event Earliness (ms) 0 0 1 2 3 5 8
Event Lateness (ms) 0 0 1 2 3 5 8
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6.2 Time-Based Matching Method
Time-based event-flow matching is based on matching the destination IP address,
source IP address, and source port similarly as the parameter-based matching
method. It increases its matching accuracy by matching only those entities that
occurred in a specific time-window. This method had been run on both the all-
information dataset and the reduced-information dataset, where it produced the
same results.
The first step in evaluating this matching method was the estimation of the
size of the time-window. For all the related events and flows in the list of the
confirmed event-flow pairs, we measured the jitter of the event time of occurrence
from the flow start and from the flow end separately, to enumerate the event
lateness and event earliness. As the DNS flow mostly consists of a single packet,
the flow start and flow end times are equal; consequently, the event lateness and
the event earliness are the same. The results may be observed in Table 5. Our
results show that only 5 % of the related events happen at the same time as
the DNS flow is captured. The possible reasons for this behavior are described
in Section 3. On the other hand, most of the events are observed with at most
8 ms jitter from their related flows.
The 8 ms lower bound on the event lateness and the event earliness show the
approximate size of the time-window to encompass most of the related events.
However, it does not encompass all the events, and the larger the window is,
the more probable it is that unrelated events and flows will be matched. The
method had been run with different time-window settings on the all-information
dataset, so the optimal size of the time-window could be found. The method’s
performance on these matching runs may be observed in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 depicts the performance for small time-window sizes. The accuracy
is close to one, as it is influenced by the vast amount of true negatives. Precision
is precisely one, as there are no false positives for small time-windows. As the
time-window expands, the number of false negatives decreases, and thus the recall
and F1-score rise fast until they reach the 99 percentile (8 ms). The resolution
of the graph then must be increased, as the changes for large time-windows are
more subtle. Figure 3 shows that the first false positives appear at the 300 ms
mark as the precision drops. The F1-score also drops, as the increase of false
positives (precision falling) is not sufficiently compensated by the increase of true
positives (recall rising). Consequently, for time-windows larger than 200 ms, the
performance of time-based matching on this dataset falls steadily.
The time-based matching method with 200 ms time-window performed bet-
ter on both datasets than the parameter-based (no qname) method. It missed
a few related pairs, producing false negatives, but the precision reached one
with no false positive pairs matched. Rated by the F1-score, this method came
second-best on the reduced-information dataset, proving decent performance on
incomplete monitoring data.
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Fig. 2. Time-Based matching perfor-
mance with small-sized time-window.
Fig. 3. Time-Based matching perfor-
mance with large-sized time-window.
































Fig. 4. Combined matching performance
with small-sized time-window.
Fig. 5. Combined matching performance
with large-sized time-window.
6.3 Combined Matching Method
The combined matching method uses the parameter-based matching where ex-
tended flow information is available and falls back to the time-based match-
ing where it is not. The method had been run on both the all-information
dataset and the reduced-information dataset. As the method used parameter-
based matching on the the all-information dataset, it produced a list of event-
flow pairs identical to the ground truth. The results on the reduced-information
dataset are further explored.
Similarly to the time-based matching method, the combined method’s per-
formance with differently sized time-windows was examined on the small and
large time-windows (Figures 4 and 5, respectively). The method behaves simi-
larly as the time-based matching, but with a few advantages. The recall starts
at a much higher value for the small windows, even with no toleration time-
window (0 ms). This is caused by the number of flows the method had been able
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to match based on their parameters only, not even considering the time-window.
As a result, the F1-score rise is more gradual even for small time-windows. The
precision and F1-score reached higher values for the large-sized windows than
time-based matching, as it missed fewer related pairs. The measured F1-score
implies that the lower and upper bound for the time-window are the same as for
time-based matching, 8 ms, and 200 ms, respectively. Consequently, the optimal
time-window remained the same at 200 ms.
The results of this method on the all-information dataset and the reduced-
information dataset may be observed in Tables 3 and 4. The results on the
reduced-information dataset make this method a promising candidate for match-
ing events and flows in the real traffic, where monitoring errors and encrypted
flows are common.
7 Lessons Learned
As shown by the event and flow capture model, the positioning of vantage points
strongly influences the event-flow matching process. The flow monitoring probe
must be positioned to capture all the flows that might invoke events on the
event-monitored devices. Otherwise, there will be gaps in measured data and a
high number of unmatchable events. The distance of the vantage points in the
network and network features like latency, jitter, and congestion, also strongly
influence the matching. Drop-outs and monitoring errors make the parameter-
based event-flow matching perform poorly. On the other hand, distant vantage
points and long latency negatively influence the time-based matching.
As our dataset shows, the observed network flows may be missing extended
features. In these cases, the suitable approach is time-based matching. However,
it requires the monitoring devices to be time-synchronized. In our dataset, all
devices had been synchronized by the NTP with millisecond precision. This
precision proved sufficient for a network with around 200 devices. With larger
networks and higher levels of DNS activity, a microsecond precision might be
needed.
8 Conclusion
According to the results of our experiment described in Section 6, the most
suitable matching method for real network traffic is the method that combines
parameter-based and time-based matching. It has the most accurate matching
performance on the traffic with valid extended flow information. When supplied
with data missing this parameter, e.g., the encrypted flows, it falls back to time-
based matching. The time-based matching needs to be optimized to the net-
work’s specifics and does not perform as good as the parameter-based matching.
However, the ability to match network flows without extended flow information
makes it a suitable candidate for matching encrypted flows.
We were able to identify the queried domain name (qname) parameter in case
of a successful match when the event-flow matching methods were run on the
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encrypted DNS flows. This parameter is otherwise encrypted and unavailable to
flow monitoring, so the event-flow matching may enrich flow monitoring with new
data. With the rising amount of encrypted network traffic, event-flow matching
might be the method to join the encrypted network flows with unencrypted
information stored in event logs.
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